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Abstract  
This essay proposes that ‘global health partnership’ might usefully be conceived as a 
boundary object, in that the term’s capacity to encompass widely divergent and incompatible 
understandings, and to facilitate mutual misunderstandings, is a crucial part of how it ‘works’ 
in the world to help bring together assemblages of people and organizations across great 
distances and steep gradients of inequality. 
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The term ‘partnership’ has recently risen to prominence in the field of global health, in the 
process acquiring multiple meanings, and as a result, as Barnes, Brown, and Harman (2016, 
22) write, ‘there is little shared understanding of what good partnership is meant to include 
or resemble in practice’. 
What to do with this multiplicity of meanings? One approach, which comes more naturally 
perhaps to bioethicists and those who move in the world of policy, involves working to 
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discipline this unruly proliferation by making a case for the (one, true, good) definition that 
should guide thinking and action with regard to ‘partnerships’. Another approach, preferred 
by many social scientists, is to decode the term, working to see through and behind its 
misleading surface appearance to the (grimmer and uglier) reality that lies behind it.  
Both approaches have their advocates, and each has its merits, but I would like to propose 
here a different tack. I propose that it might be interesting and helpful to take the messy 
multiplicity of meanings attached to the word ‘partnership’ not as a problem to be solved (by 
participants or by analysts) but instead as a central feature of how the term does its work. 
Those who seek to discipline or decode the term ‘partnership’ are arguably engaged in 
‘telling the truth’, where truth is understood to inhere in a mimetic relationship between 
word and world. What if we instead turn our curiosity and attention toward what Arthur 
Frank (2010, 92) calls ‘the truth of the telling’ and ask, in the spirit of dialogical narrative 
analysis: how does this term do its work in the world?  
The Oxford English Dictionary entry for the word ‘partner’ suggests some of the ways that the 
word ‘partnership’ itself, by the range of meanings it encompasses, may play a role in 
suturing together unequal parties who hold quite different or even incompatible views of 
what it is they have jointly embarked upon. At one end of this spectrum of meanings, a 
‘partner’ is someone who has a share of ownership, an investment, and thus a stake in 
sharing the expenses, and profits and losses, of a business enterprise. Such joint interest and 
shared stakes are implicit as metaphorical referents in the narrow biological meaning of 
‘partner’ as one of a group of two or more symbiotically associated organisms. But ‘partner’ 
can also refer to a friend, lover, or spouse, a resonance that is picked up in Iruka Okeke’s 
discussion of ‘divorce’ and Yap Boum’s reference to ‘prenuptial contract’, in their 
contributions to this issue. Or then again, a ‘partner’ can be a teammate, the person with 
whom one engages in structured activities such as dancing, cards, tennis, or cricket. Unless, 
of course, what one is voicing is the less common meaning of ‘partner’, as referring to an 
‘adherent or worshipper’. 
So what are we talking about, when we talk about a ‘partnership’? The answer may depend 
on which of these meanings are activated and mobilized in any instance of the term’s use. 
Sometimes, the term may refer to a (quasi)legal (quasi)business arrangement, in which 
ownership, risk, gains, and losses are to be divided and shared according to formalized 
protocols. In other instances, it may refer to a social relationship that entails emotional 
attachments, love, attraction, ongoing moral obligations, and expectations of reciprocity 
(though not necessarily of equality). Then again, the word can be deployed to describe (and 
perhaps thus to claim) a role as a participant in a collaborative activity that adheres to rules 
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based in aesthetic and sporting traditions, pursuing art, fun, or fame and glory. This range of 
meanings creates conditions ripe for mutual misunderstanding, as the same term may, for 
different parties and/or for the same party on different occasions, convey very different 
frameworks for conceptualizing what is being embarked upon in the ‘partnership’.  
I do not wish to suggest, however, that this is merely a matter of miscommunication, to be 
solved simply by having everyone sit down together and talk things through, and explain 
what they really mean. Quite the contrary: the capacity of the word ‘partner’ (or by extension 
‘partnership’) to encompass such divergent understandings, and in effect to facilitate mutual 
misunderstandings, is arguably precisely why it can bring together assemblages of people and 
organizations across great distances and steep gradients of inequality. The specific 
contribution of this (or any other) linguistic usage, of course, takes shape always in the 
context of political-economic arrangements – in this case, the vast institutional, 
infrastructural, and financial investments already in place around ‘global health partnerships’ 
– that powerfully constrain what people can do, including what meanings they can enact, and 
how. Framed thus within a practice-oriented analytical approach, the term ‘partnership’ 
might usefully be conceived as a boundary object, in the sense articulated by Susan Leigh 
Star and James Griesemer (1989, 393), who explain: 
Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs 
and constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain 
a common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and 
become strongly structured in individual-site use. They may be abstract or concrete. 
They have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common 
enough to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation. 
The creation and management of boundary objects is key in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.  
Ethnographic studies of organ transfer offer an interesting comparison. As Lesley A. Sharp 
(2001, 2006) has shown, competing and incommensurable metaphors are used to describe 
organ transfer to different parties at different stages of the process. The metaphor of the 
organ as a ‘gift’ is implicit within the technical language of ‘donation’, and is used to 
encourage organ donation among family members of a person whose death happens under 
circumstances that make it an option. Bereaved family members are encouraged to think of 
organ donation as a gift, and to imagine the person who died as ‘living on’ through others 
who will be helped. An organ construed as a ‘gift’, however, places an impossible burden 
upon the recipient, who is left with a debt that by definition can never be repaid. With 
recipients, the language used to describe organs instead uses metaphors that refer to ‘life’ 
more neutrally in relation to plants, through terms such as ‘harvesting’ and imagery featuring 
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greenery, and for them the organ is a form of commodity. Donor families, in other words, 
are motivated to give a ‘gift’, an act implying the creation of a social relationship that 
involves ongoing ties of obligation reciprocity, but what recipients understand themselves to 
be accepting is an organ that has been ‘harvested’, and is described in terms that detach it 
from the person who died. Here too, these meanings are enacted in the context of powerful 
institutional, professional, and financial investments in organ transfer; mutual 
misunderstanding is critical to how the whole system works. 
Annemarie Mol’s (2002) ethnographic description of ‘ontology in medical practice’ also 
offers a model for how to attend to the multiple, sometimes incompatible, realities that the 
single term ‘global health partnerships’ may encompass (and let us simply note, in passing, 
that each of the three words of which this compound term is comprised is, in its own right, 
similarly multiple). In an ethnographic study of atherosclerosis, carried out in a hospital in 
the Netherlands, Mol shows how this disease gets enacted across a wide range of sites: ‘If we 
no longer presume “disease” to be a universal object hidden under the body’s skin, but make 
the praxiographic shift to studying bodies and diseases while they are being enacted in daily 
hospital practices, multiplication follows. In practice, a disease, atherosclerosis, is no longer 
one. Followed while being enacted, atherosclerosis multiplies’ (Mol 2002, 83). 
Mol’s account reveals how atherosclerosis ‘is’ one kind of entity as performed in the 
pathology department, but at the same time ‘is’ something quite different as enacted in 
clinical encounters and elsewhere. In the outpatient clinic atherosclerosis is (or more 
accurately, gets enacted as) a particular set of signs and symptoms presented by a person 
whose legs hurt when they walk; while in the pathology laboratory it is a thickening of the 
layers of cells inside a cross-sectional slice of artery, as visualized under a microscope. 
Clearly, these two ways of ‘doing’ the same disease are incompatible; the living breathing 
person complaining of pain cannot at the same time be the body sliced up for examination 
under a microscope. Mol (2002, 116) details how this irreducible multiplicity is managed, by 
being distributed, so that the disease continues to ‘hang together even so’. 
Recent ethnographic work attending to the ways that ‘global health partnerships’ are 
described by parties who are very differently positioned similarly reveals how they suture 
together, though never without friction, competing and incompatible expectations, 
metaphors, and ontologies. For example, Johanna Crane’s (2002) ethnographic study of a 
global health partnership in Uganda documents the very different expectations that African 
and US-based scientists brought to their research partnership. As she shows, a computerized 
data system installed in the Ugandan clinic was understood by some parties as a ‘donation’, 
by others as a collaboration, or by still others as a means of generating income; these 
different expectations and understandings gave rise, in turn, to quite different emotions, 
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ranging from gratitude to resentment to a sense of entitlement. And as Hannah Brown 
(2015, 550) points out, in an insightful discussion of a partnership between the Kenyan 
Ministries of Health and organizations funded by the US President’s Emergency Fund for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): ‘it was what fundamentally differentiated the two partners that held 
them together; the Americans had access to resources and the Kenyans had legitimate 
sovereign responsibility for Kenyan citizens. For each side of the partnership, governance 
without the other was impossible. These differences brought and held the partners together, 
structuring the form of their integration and constraining possibilities for renegotiating the 
terms of the relationship’.  
The ambiguities and misunderstandings inherent in the term ‘partner’ are, in short, 
productive: they are part of how the word accomplishes its work, through being enacted in 
multiple ways, just as they are part of the reality to which it refers. Attending to these 
multiplicities encompassed within ‘global health partnerships’, how they are activated and 
what kinds of work they accomplish in the world, is an important contribution that 
humanistic scholarship can make to improving how we understand ‘global health 
partnerships’. The elusive hope, and the great challenge, is to translate this insight into 
improving how they are practiced. 
About the author 
Janelle S. Taylor is Professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of 
Washington. Her research has addressed a range of topics in medical technology, medical 
education, and medical practice. Most recently, she has been exploring issues of recognition, 
care, and social inclusion in regard to dementia. 
References 
Barnes, Amy, Garrett W. Brown, and Sophie Harman. 2016. ‘Understanding Global Health 
and Development Partnerships: Perspectives from African and Global Health 
System Professionals’. Social Science & Medicine 159: 22–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.04.033. 
Brown, Hannah. 2015. ‘Global Health Partnerships, Governance, and Sovereign 
Responsibility in Western Kenya’. American Ethnologist 42 (2): 340–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.12134.  
Crane, Johanna Tayloe. 2013. Scrambling for Africa: AIDS, Expertise, and the Rise of Global Health 
Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Frank, Arthur. 2010. Letting Stories Breathe: A Socio-Narratology. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
What the word ‘partnership’ conjoins, and what it does 6 
Mol, Annemarie. 2002. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Sharp, Lesley A. 2001. ‘Commodified Kin: Death, Mourning, and Competing Claims on the 
Bodies of Organ Donors in the United States’. American Anthropologist 103 (1): 112–
33. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2001.103.1.112.  
Sharp, Lesley A. 2006. Strange Harvest: Organ Transplants, Denatured Bodies, and the Transformed 
Self. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Star, Susan Leigh, and James R. Griesemer. 1989. ‘Institutional Ecology, “Translations” and 
Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate 
Zoology, 1907-39’. Social Studies of Science 19 (3): 387–420. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/030631289019003001.  
 
